Economic Design Network
 
Australian Research Council’s Economic Design Network Winter School on Repeated Games and Reputations
15 July – 21 July 2009 (Five days: 15-17 and 20-21 July)
University of New South Wales, Australia
 
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Schedule
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Sponsored by:
 
Economic Design Network
 
 
 
 
 
2009 EDN Winter School Schedule
 

Presenters:
Professor George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Professor Larry Samuelson (Yale University)


Venue: Hugh Dixson Theatre, AGSM Building at the University of New South Wales

Repeated Games and Reputations

The course will begin with the basics of repeated games of complete information, including the formulation of the problem, equilibrium concepts, and basic analytical techniques such as the one-shot deviation principal and self-generation. These will be used to derive the basic folk theorem results and explore applications. Attention will then turn to the theory of games of imperfect public monitoring, with particular emphasis on techniques for bounding sets of equilibrium payoffs, again culminating in a folk theorem. The course will continue to cover recent work on repeated games of private monitoring and reputations.

The text for the course is Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships by George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Oxford University Press, 2006.

The tentative schedule is as follows (with the relevant sections from the text indicated).

  1. The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring (MS §2.1–2.5, 3.3)
  2. Applications 1, Random Matching and Relationships in Context (MS §3.3, 5.1, 5.2)
  3. Applications 2, Time Consistency and Risk Sharing (MS §6.2, 6.3)
  4. Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (MS §7.1-3, 7.7, 7.8)
  5. Bounding Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs (MS §8.1-8.2, 8.4)
  6. The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring (MS §9.1-9.5, 9.8)
  7. Applications 3 (MS §11.1, 11.2 or 11.4)
  8. Reputations with Short-Lived Players, Perfect Monitoring (MS §2.7, 15.1-15.3)
  9. Reputations with Short-Lived Players, Imperfect Monitoring (MS §7.6, 8.3, 15.4–15.5)
  10. Applications 4, Modelling Reputations (MS §18.1, 18.2, 18.4, 18.7)

Daily Schedule

15 July (Wednesday)

8:30 – 8:50  Registration
8:50 – 9:00  Welcome: Bill Schworm
9:00 – 10:15       Lecture 1 – A
10:15 – 10:45     Morning tea
10:45 – 12:00     Lecture 1 – B
12:00 – 14:30     Lunch
14:30 – 15:45     Lecture 2 – A
15:45 – 16:15     Afternoon tea
16:15 – 17: 30    Lecture 2 – B
17:30 – 19:30    Welcome reception (AGSM open area)

16 July (Thursday)

8:30 – 9:00  Tea and coffee
9:00 – 10:15       Lecture 3 – A
10:15 – 10:45     Morning tea
10:45 – 12:00     Lecture 3 – B
12:00 – 13:30     Lunch
13:30 – 14:20     Discussion Session  I
14:20 – 14:30     Break
14:30 – 15:45     Lecture 4 – A
15:45 – 16:15     Afternoon tea
16:15 – 17: 30    Lecture 4 – B 

17 July (Friday)

8:30 – 9:00  Tea and coffee
9:00 – 10:15       Lecture 5 – A
10:15 – 10:45     Morning tea
10:45 – 12:00     Lecture 5 – B
12:00 – 14:00     Lunch
14:00 – 14:30     Suggestions for weekend activities
14:30 – 15:45     Lecture 6 – A
15:45 – 16:15     Afternoon tea
16:15 – 17: 30    Lecture 6 – B
19:00 – 21:30    Dinner (Business Lounge at the Australian School of Business Building)

18 and 19 July (Saturday and Sunday)
No lectures

20 July (Monday)
8:30 – 9:00  Tea and coffee
9:00 – 10:15       Lecture 7 – A
10:15 – 10:45     Morning tea
10:45 – 12:00     Lecture 7 – B
12:00 – 13:30     Lunch
13:30 – 14:20     Discussion Session II
14:20 – 14:30     Break
14:30 – 15:45     Lecture 8 – A
15:45 – 16:15     Afternoon tea
16:15 – 17: 30    Lecture 8 – B 

21 July (Tuesday)
8:30 – 9:00  Tea and coffee
9:00 – 10:15       Lecture 9 – A
10:15 – 10:45     Morning tea
10:45 – 12:00     Lecture 9 – B
12:00 – 14:00     Lunch
14:00 – 15:15     Lecture 10 – A
15:15 – 15:45     Afternoon tea
15:45 – 17: 00    Lecture 10 – B
17:00 – 17:10     Farewell