Professor George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania) and Professor Larry Samuelson (Yale University)

The 2009 Winter School will be devoted to the study of repeated games and reputations. The course will begin with the basics of repeated games of complete information, including the formulation of the problem, equilibrium concepts, and basic analytical techniques such as the one-shot deviation principal and self-generation. These will be used to derive the basic folk theorem results and explore applications. Attention will then turn to the theory of games of imperfect public monitoring, with particular emphasis on techniques for bounding sets of equilibrium payoffs, again culminating in a folk theorem. The course will continue to cover recent work on repeated games of private monitoring and reputations. The main reference for the course is “Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships” by George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Oxford University Press © 2006.